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Abstract: 
China’s effort in the past two decades to develop technological entrepreneurship by means of 
establishing science parks and business incubators is unique in terms of both its large scale 
and the speed with which this has been achieved. This paper attempts to contribute on the 
understanding of China’s technological entrepreneurship promotion programs by positioning 
their policies and practice against an international context where the governance model 
appears to show much variation. Distinctive features identified for China after a broad 
comparison, however, draw attention to two major discrepancies between policy discourse 
and practice: 1) contrary to the claims of central policy makers that science parks were 
established to help nurture capabilities in domestic corporations, it has becoming increasingly 
clear that foreign direct investment (FDI) is considered the key to their success; 2) instead of 
being embedded in the local milieu as an interface for R&D, industry and education, 
technology transfer and commercialization in business incubators still heavily rely on funds 
and subsidies from the central government, and thus barely contribute to local 
entrepreneurship development. 
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Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has long been seen as having a central role in the long-run process 
of technology change, thus a major driving force behind sustained economic growth 
(Baumol, 2002; Schumpeter and Opie, 1934). Since the mid 1980s, entrepreneurship 
has been linked to the emergence of new, high-tech sectors in advanced industrialized 
countries, particularly in a sense that it constitutes a vital catalyst for successful 
linkages between research and production (Acs, 2004; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005). 
Today, industry relies more and more on academic research for generating marketable 
innovation while successful innovation is dependent on the existence of 
entrepreneurship to enable the introduction of a new technology into the market. In 
other words, there is an increasing demand for technological entrepreneurship (Baark, 
1994). 
The legendary story of Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the U.S., whose defining 
characteristic is the clustering of high-technology firms and the synergies it creates 
among various institutions in the cluster, has spurred the interest and belief that 
science parks and their affiliated business incubators are the most efficient policy 
tools to nurture technological entrepreneurship, in terms that they can not only 
provide an interface between universities, R&D and production activities but also are 
conducive to the promotion of network environments where industry agglomeration 
and the exchange of ideas can take place (Hu, 2007; Komninos, 1997; Sutherland, 
2005). As a consequence, although neither Silicon Valley nor Route 128 was a 
deliberate product of government policy, countries around the world, developed or 
under-developed, have attempted to emulate the American success stories by offering 
policy incentives to encourage high-technology firm formation in designated locations. 
Better known examples of such parks comprise Cambridge, U.K., Tsukuba in Japan, 
Taiwan’s Tsinchu Technology Park and the ZhongGuanCun in China. 
As in many other developed and developing nations, the science and technology 
industry parks as the Chinese variant of science parks, together with their on site 
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technology business incubators, have experienced a conspicuous growth since the late 
1980s (Harwit, 2002; Lalkaka, 2003). This paper, in response, considers China’s 
approach to develop its own science parks and technology business incubators as part 
of a plan to foster technological entrepreneurship and reform its innovation system in 
a comparative context. It finds that, unsurprisingly, China’s highly pragmatic 
economic reform, particularly the asymmetric decentralization process (Chien and 
Gordon, 2008), has seriously diverted its science parks and business incubators from 
their primary objectives into a stronger bias towards production of export oriented 
high-tech manufactures, which sharply contrasts against those found in the West.  
The next sections of this paper will first review the history of science parks and 
business incubators development in ‘Western’ context, within the U.S. and Western 
Europe, aiming to identify those general as well as contingent governance factors that 
have affected their performance; then consider the Chinese case in rather more depth 
and how its uniqueness may be better understood. Because its purpose is to frame a 
comparative analysis, this paper has avoided close engagement either with the 
empirical literature or with overlapping sets of theoretical reasoning, in the interest of 
developing a clearer line of argument to highlight contextual factors that might 
generate significantly different versions of governance in the nurturing of 
technological entrepreneurship.  
Significant Features of Western Experiences 
The governance of technology entrepreneurship development has charted different 
paths in the U.S. and in Western Europe. In the American case, as a spontaneous 
response to the industry demand and the pressures of territorial competition, science 
parks and business incubators were both first created in the 1950s1. While the science 
parks have clearly committed themselves to local communities’ demand of technology 
advancement and spillovers, business incubators were actually a mean to revitalize 
declining manufacturing areas in the beginning and offered services to all kinds of 
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enterprises, from low-tech to no-tech, as a tool for reconversion (Aernoudt, 2004). 
However, during the proliferation of business incubators since the late 1970s, 
technology and the capacity to conduct research were increasingly recognized as the 
core factors in growth and development, thus the so-called technology incubators 
started to take a significant share in new incubation programs while half of them were 
developed around specific industrial and technological clusters such as biotechnology, 
information technology, environmental technology, or, speech technology in 
associated science parks (Lalkaka, 2002; Sutherland, 2005). This explains how 
‘science parks’ and ‘incubators’ have become inseparable terms when people refer to 
technological entrepreneurship promotion instruments nowadays. 
Throughout the whole aforementioned process, which apparently happened prior 
to the prevalence of the National Innovation System (NIS) theory (Freeman, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1992; R. R Nelson, 1993), the U.S. were barely informed of the role that a 
government ‘should’ play in the respect of promoting technological entrepreneurship. 
Rather, as usual, strong market demands from associated industries and the localized 
economic interest in entrepreneurship again provided essential impetus for the 
widespread trial and acceptance of science parks and technology incubators (Giesecke, 
2000). In a context with no real experience of top-down spatial policy, except briefly 
and partially during the Great Depression in 1930s, there is a focus of locality on the 
promotion of economic initiatives such as the establishment of a science park in U.S. 
Therefore, on one hand, the construction of science parks in U.S. has been mostly 
regarded as a pure continuation of private market processes ‘by innovative means’; on 
the other hand, their popularity reflected the unabashed competition among those host 
regions for technology and investment by engaging in extensive mimicry of each 
others’ initiatives. Such a combination of industry incentives and local interests on the 
U.S. fertile entrepreneurship soil, in result, has yielded by far the most effective and 
competitive governance model of science parks and technology incubators across the 
world (Kuhlmann, 2001; Malik and Cunningham, 2006; Richard R. Nelson, 2008). 
The development of Science Parks in Western Europe clearly received its early 
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impetus from the United States’ experience. As an illustration, there is a clear link 
between observing the early success of a Science Park at Stanford, CA and its 
replication in Cambridge, UK. There is, however, a considerable time lag between the 
establishment of the Stanford Park in the 1950s and the establishment of the 
Cambridge Science Park, Sophia Antipolis in France and Haasroed in Belgium in the 
late 1960s. Like their predecessors in U.S., these early science parks were largely 
initiatives of universities and the private sector. In contrast, by the 1980s a second 
much larger wave of government-supported construction took off. Unlike the first 
wave, the second was also linked to broader economic and political change and was 
marked by the rise of new types of economic activity in new high-tech industries – 
first of all, the advantage position of U.S. and Japan in technology competitiveness as 
well as the emergence and prevalence of the NIS theory, together inspired Western 
European countries to overcome their backwardness and inherent deficiencies in 
innovation capability by exploiting ‘innovation policies’ (Kuhlmann, 2001); Secondly, 
the progress of trade liberalization with the European Union (EU) has conspicuously 
reversed the orientation of spatial economic policies in Western Europe, from 
nationally based top-down ‘regional policies’, with a strong emphasis on spatial 
equity and political cohesion, toward a bottom-up focus, in which initiatives such as 
the interests on science parks emerged from particular places, each pursuing their own 
economic interests (Chien and Gordon, 2008). 
One of the first business incubators in Europe was set up by UK in 1975, when 
British steel formed a subsidiary to create jobs in steel closure areas. Similar to the 
U.S. experience, business incubators in Western Europe first became an instrument to 
promote a more diversified base for regional economies and later became a tool for 
improving regional competitiveness by fostering the emergence of technology-based 
firms in the ear of the New Economy (Aernoudt, 2004; Storey and Tether, 1998; 
Sutherland, 2005). Since the early 1980s, business incubators tended to seek closer 
contacts with the centers of knowledge creation such as universities, MNCs’ R&D 
departments and public research institutions, which could be easily found within 
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science parks. In Germany for instance, the University of Berlin established its first 
business incubators in 1983, aimed at facilitating the transfer of research findings to 
industry. France followed in 1985 creating an incubator within the Sophia Antipolis 
Technology Park. As a result, similar to the host science parks, it is rather difficult to 
construct a generalized overview of the European business incubator scene because of 
the diversified regional objectives these incubators have served in the name of 
fostering technological entrepreneurship: in Belgium and Spain, the focus was 
initially to attract branches of multinational firms, in Germany the targets was clearly 
innovative startups, in France and the Netherlands incubators were mostly located in 
university science parks to assist the filing of patents (Aernoudt, 2004).  
The governance of technological entrepreneurship in Western Europe, in contrast 
to the U.S. case, appeared to be distinctively stimulated by the strong government 
response to the steadier shift to a post-industrial economy, which was additionally 
strengthened by the presence of the NIS theory (Georghiou, 2001; Giesecke, 2000; 
Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003; Shapira et al., 2001). The enormous growth rate of 
science parks and business incubators in Europe indentified by relevant empirical 
studies (Giesecke, 2000; Komninos, 1997; Storey and Tether, 1998; Sutherland, 2005) 
manifests a policy-driven catch-up strategy, wherein European countries are striving 
to exploit on the proliferation of technological entrepreneurship as the U.S. does. 
Although there are long-running debates concerning the degree to which it is 
legitimate for governments to intervene in the economy in support of innovation, the 
belief in NIS theory and especially the recognition of the existence of market and 
system failures in European societies (Edler and Georghiou, 2007), finally results in 
an active, direct and interventionist governance model of science parks and business 
incubators development in Europe. Besides those individual national approaches, 
coordinated initiatives were taken at the EU level as well. In 1984 the EU began a 
European Business Innovation Network (EBN). Since then, 150 Business Innovation 
Centers (BICs) have developed across 20 countries. BICs are incubator-like 
organizations providing consultancy, taking part in technology transfers and 
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organizing training sessions mainly for technology-based firms. To this date, BICs 
account for nearly two-thirds of the technology business incubators in Italy, France, 
Spain, and Portugal (Aernoudt, 2004).  
Notwithstanding such important differences in the governance of technological 
entrepreneurship, there is of course a great deal in common between the two 
continents, most notably the representation of local coalitions’ economic interests, 
buttressed by pluralistic political processes and openly competitive elections, and an 
expectation that innovation and technology transfer activities should constitute the 
nucleus of science parks and business incubators. Although government intervention 
has mobilized the rapid expansion of technological entrepreneurship promotion 
programs in Europe, a consensus formed within important local stakeholders such as 
universities, industrial associations and labor unions is still indispensable before the 
full operation of a science park or an incubator, which is subject to its longstanding 
pluralistic democracy tradition that also applies in the U.S. context. In addition, the 
governments’ intention to abuse science parks and business incubators for their own 
particular interest, e.g. generating more tax revenue by merely selling lands and 
hosting large MNCs, which has occasionally presented both in the U.S. and the 
Western Europe (Chien and Gordon, 2008; Cooke, 2001), tends to be ultimately 
rectified because of the local coalitions’ concerted claim on the expectation of 
associated programs, viz. the interface between research and industry.  
It is yet very difficult to assess Europe’s catch-up performance in the governance 
of technological entrepreneurship compared to the first mover, the U.S. However, a 
noticeable and widely believed criticism is that despite the governments’ strong 
intervention and the active responses from the local coalitions, the links between 
higher education and research institutes and science parks and business incubators 
remained weak in Europe and this restrains considerably their capabilities to supply 
technologies and innovation services (Felsenstein, 1994; Quintas and Massey, 1992; 
Sutherland, 2005; Westhead and Storey, 1994). Seen from this light, Geisecke (2000) 
concluded that government itself can not create all elements of a favorable ‘economic 
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ecology’ for technological entrepreneurship: a system of variables that constitute the 
innovation system around science parks and incubators is too complex to be 
anticipated by government actors in advance; the existence of these determinants, and 
more importantly, the efficacy of governmental attempts to cultivate them, always 
vary across political, historical and cultural idiosyncrasies. 
Science Parks and Business Incubators in China 
China launched on a series of science and technology policy initiatives at the 
beginning of the reform era in an attempt to boost its science and technology 
capabilities. Some of these focused on basic research such as the establishment of the 
Key National Laboratories; others, such as the Tackle (Gong Guan) Program, were 
geared towards serving the immediate technological needs of Chinese industries. The 
“863” Plan2, or the High Technology Research and Development Plan, on the other 
hand, aimed to bridge China’s gap with the world frontier in a select few new and 
high technological areas, such as biotechnology, electronics, and information 
technology. Meanwhile, given the legacy of the centrally planned system in which 
scientific research and production were not closely coupled (Simon, 1989), 
‘developing closer ties’ was particularly highlighted as an important policy objective.  
The Development of China’s Science Parks and Business Incubators 
In recognition of the lack of institutions that would support new- and high-technology 
firm formation and other mechanisms of technological diffusion, the Torch Program 
was put in place in 1988 with the main objective to develop high- and new-technology 
products, establish technology-oriented enterprises, and pave the way for the 
commercialization of innovations that will come out of major national science and 
technology programs. A major ingredient of the Torch Program was the establishment 
of science parks3, where most of the new- and high- technology commercialization 
efforts were expected to take place and where such efforts were to receive various 
forms of government subsidies. In March 1991, the State Council approved the 
 10 
 
establishment of 27 science parks, followed by yet another 25 in the following year. 
The establishment of the Yanglin Agricultural Technology Park in the western 
Chinese province of Shannxi in 1997 brings the total number of national science parks 
to 53. In the meantime, a large number of science parks have also been established by 
various levels of local government. These parks do not usually apply the same 
relatively stringent criteria that the national parks use to certify the high-technology 
status of firms in the park. It is plausible that these local parks operate on a different 
mechanism from the national parks. Therefore, this paper focuses on the experiences 
and lessons from the national science parks. 
 The Torch Program, as well as overseeing general park development, has also 
been responsible for the development of technology business incubators, known as 
high-tech innovation centers (ICs) in China. These are usually based within the park 
zones, often in a dedicated building. The impetus to create ICs was driven by the 
conviction among China’s authorities that the 3,000 or so business incubators found 
world wide have greatly contributed to the development of technological 
entrepreneurship and the knowledge economy and that they are sure to play a more 
important role in the twenty-first century. Just as innovation centers have grown up 
around successful science parks in the west, Chinese policy makers looked to emulate 
this trend.  
With encouragement from the UNDP, the first incubator, the Wuhan Donghu 
Innovation Centre, was approved in 1987. After this the ICs started to quickly grow 
on the back of the Torch Program’s support. Their growth, therefore, has basically 
been a top down initiative, in which the science parks have been specifically assigned 
and instructed to build and run incubators. Within 20 years, by the end of 2007, the 
Torch Program has established and certified 548 ICs at a stunning speed (MOST, 
2007). 
Despite the preceding efforts, based on the recent observations from the limited 
empirical literatures which shed light on China’s science parks and business 
incubators (Hu, 2007; Ma and Goo, 2005; Sutherland, 2005; Walcott, 2003), it is 
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argued that the most noticeable feature of the parks is that they have become 
increasingly oriented to the wholesale importation of foreign technology, in the form 
of inward investment, as opposed to promotion of indigenous firms and technologies 
via institutional reform. As a result the most striking feature of the park areas is their 
importance to China’s total industrial production and export rather than the 
restructuring of its innovation system (see table 1). This is perhaps unsurprising given 
China’s highly pragmatic approach to economic reform, especially given the lessons 
drawn from the Western Europe’s experience—domestic context, particularly 
domestic politics, institutions, and norms will strongly molds the manner in which 
regulatory reinvention is realized in practice. It is perhaps banal to point out that this 
disconnection between aspiration and practice also holds for China in addition to the 
precedent in Europe. What is more useful here is to attempt to explain the unique 
sources of this divergence for the improvement of governance in China. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
Governing Technological Entrepreneurship: the Chinese Style 
As with many reforms in China, the promotion of science parks initially looked to 
borrow from what were considered the successful experiences of other nations. The 
science park model was considered particularly suitable and attractive. This is because 
the model offered the possibility that a region with no prior industrial history could 
make a direct leap to a leading-edge industrial economy, given the right set of 
circumstances, without the time and effort required to pass through any intermediate 
stages of development (Sutherland, 2005). As reforms have unfolded, however, 
idiosyncrasies of the country started to reshape its program’s profile. Among them, 
the following economic and political factors appear to be most influential: 
 
The national development strategy. As in Europe, shifting competitive pressures and 
closer integration into an international economy were key structural influences on the 
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growth of science parks in China, though both worked quite differently in the Chinese 
context. Thus, whereas in Europe the shift towards a more flexible, post-Fordist, 
post-industrial economy, with a greater emphasis on quality competition was an 
important factor, the Chinese context was of industrialization, price competition and 
an emergent kind of Fordism. Therefore, the Chinese government’s early enthusiasm 
on science parks and ICs initially reflected a foresight that is ahead of its development 
stage. 
However, while traditional manufacturing sectors gradually start to experience 
declining terms of trade and the high-technology sectors are increasingly seen as the 
most dynamic areas of global demand, Chinese government was pressured to desire a 
radical update of its export structure by moving away from labor-intensive low 
value-added manufactures (for which special economic zones became renowned). In 
order to gear its export trade towards the high-tech sector, Chinese leaders hope to 
raise the contribution from high-tech exports by four-fold by 2010 and account for 
over 30 percent of total export, bringing China’s export structure closer in line with 
that of developed nations. As an immediate response, the central government rapidly 
integrated the science parks into China’s overall trade strategy. In early 2000, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Foreign Trade approved 16 of 
the 53 state level parks as a trial group of high-tech export bases. 
As a consequence, a distinguishing feature of China’s parks has been shaped, in 
keeping with the imposed command of the central government and the national trade 
strategy, viz. they produce a disproportionately high share of high-tech goods for 
export. Further, in order to accomplish this radical trade and production expansion, 
China’s parks had to heavily depend on foreign direct investment (FDI) rather than 
counting on China’s own scientific, technological and economic strength. 
 
Asymmetric decentralization and the FDI fever of local governments. A salient 
similarity in the Western model of technological entrepreneurship’s governance is the 
representation of local entities’ interests and petitions throughout the decision making 
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process, which stems from its pluralistic democracy tradition. The appearance of the 
science parks and business incubators in China, where provincial and city 
governments are acknowledged to have played a key role in rapid recent growth 
marks a notable exception then. For, despite substantial liberalization of external 
economic relations and a burgeoning domestic private sector, the country remains an 
authoritarian Communist society. Top officials and cadres of sub-national 
governments are not elected locally but appointed and removed by upper level 
governments, on the basis of a quite systematic screening of candidates’ credentials, 
among which, since the early 1980s increasing weight has been given to objective 
assessments of concrete economic achievements in terms of local GDP growth, FDI 
attraction and revenue generation (Oi, 1995). Performance-based personnel 
management served to trigger careerism as a political incentive for local leaders to 
pursue stronger economic development. The more growth, the better are the chances 
to get advancement, with increasing power and other rewards. 
 Consequently, local governments since the reform all strove to accrue the greatest 
amount of resources, bargaining for the most favorable policy concessions and 
seeking to generate the highest growth rates. This race among local governments 
focused very heavily on inward investment rather than promotion of competitive 
advantage for local firms, since the former may result in immediate FDI and GDP 
achievements within the ambitious local leader’s prefecture. Accordingly, when the 
central government has forsaken its original target of nurturing technological 
entrepreneurship in indigenous Chinese corporations in science parks, local 
governments exhibited few interests to defend the root of their regional 
competitiveness in the long-run. On the contrary, local officials competed with each 
other on more preferential policies devised to attract MNCs while leaving these firms 
with greater negotiating power and considered themselves as essentially sales people 
responsible for selling their parks to investors, in order to cash out their land for more 
revenue (Chien and Gordon, 2008; Sutherland, 2005). 
 Meanwhile, despite economic liberalization, relations between governments/ 
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official and society/ industry, university and research institution/ professional 
consultants remain asymmetric in political terms. Incrementally, local governments in 
China have displayed more external interests in an attempt to unleash the economic 
dynamism of societal groups, but in a way that directs that power toward its own 
goals. In result, other local entities still have negligible influence over the direction 
and pace of the development of science parks, because of the public sector’s 
overwhelming control of policy, financial leverage and land leasing. Such an 
unbalanced situation between local governments and societies again set the Chinese 
case and the West model apart, impeding China’s science parks to create synergies in 
the local milieu (Hu, 2007). 
 
The policy duality. Complementing the development of large-scale high-tech 
industrial production, a second purpose of the parks has been to promote dozens of 
ICs. By comparison with the large production plants run by enterprises in the actual 
parks, the ICs are usually single buildings housing a relatively small number of 
start-up businesses. They are, accordingly, far smaller concerns. This gives the 
science parks an interesting duality. While the incubators in comparison make 
negligible contributions to output they were created and maintained with the main 
intention of nurturing new technology-based enterprises. The implication of this is 
that, since ICs’ limited resources are hardly worth of being redirected to efficiently 
attract inward investment or expand production capacity, they have been exempted 
from local governments’ expropriation and thus being preserved under the policy 
duality. However, the local governments’ indifference and their particular 
near-sighted behavioral pattern (Oi, 1995) inevitably leave these ICs isolated from the 
local context, where local entities except for the government have no power or 
resources to interact with the ICs. At this point, Chinese ICs appear to experience the 
same sufferings of the BICs in Europe, which have been regarded as airborne 
incubators directly sponsored and supervised by EU and immediately lost the impetus 
from local coalitions after losing their initial EU funding (Aernoudt, 2004) 
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Although ICs have been advertised as the innovation basis of the parks and the 
main medium in China of supporting new technology-based firms as well as 
commercializing scientific discoveries to cultivate new sources of economic growth 
(Harwit, 2002; Lalkaka, 2003), it should be cautioned that it is hard to know how 
effective these incubators have been. There remain few truly spectacular growth 
stories, and it is still unclear what the success rate of firms is after graduating from the 
incubators. In the context of the development of small technological enterprises in 
China, their contribution can still only be considered negligible. In fact, millions of 
small enterprises have already emerged in China without the preferential treatment or 
direct cost to the state incurred by those in incubators. Moreover, in terms of their 
contribution to the commercialization of technology and development of new high 
growth sectors, the purpose for which they were created, it remains as yet too early to 
reach any definitive judgment regarding their contribution.  
Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, science parks and business incubators experienced a rapid 
growth in China, where the former have contributed a rather significant share in 
industrial production and become strong magnets for FDI, and the latter remain 
heavily dependent on comprehensive supports from the central government and 
disconnected from local milieu. Though their presence as an attempt to foster 
technological entrepreneurship might seem to represent an element of convergence 
with western development patterns, consistent with the process of market 
liberalization underway in the country, the form taken by technological 
entrepreneurship governance in China has been very different from any observed in 
the West. Two key hallmarks have been: varying targets in accordance with the central 
government’s economic strategy at the macro-level; and exclusive influence from the 
local officials at the micro-level without participation of other entities. Both reflect 
the asymmetric character of rescaling in the Chinese governmental structure with 
some real devolution of economic and fiscal responsibilities being accompanied by a 
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firm insistence on the centralization of political control in Beijing and in Communist 
Party apparatus. The pattern of outcomes – including the neglect of restructuring 
China’s innovation system and paving the way for the commercialization of 
indigenous innovations – also seems to have less in common with those identified in 
the West, where science parks in principle exclude the manufacturing side of business 
and are supposed to act as zones for innovation and cooperation among R&D, 
industry and education. 
 More specifically, it should be noted that there is no single ‘western’ model of 
science parks and business incubators. As has been shown in Section 2, European 
practice in this field still differs a lot from the characteristic American model. Chinese 
practice, though quite distinct from either, actually echoes in different ways both 
European and North American forms of governance: the European in the way that a 
prominent influence from the central state’s leadership and direction; and the 
American in the active, spontaneous devotion of the local economic and social 
systems although in the Chinese case, local governments’ interests prevail over the 
others.  
 From the point of view of innovation system reform, science parks and business 
incubators in China have been a disappointment, especially in terms of their 
incapability to construct a supportive interface for domestic technology innovation 
and create synergies among local entities. However, this is not to say that from other 
perspectives they have not been a success. As with a number of other economic 
reforms, policy makers have adopted a highly pragmatic approach. The policies to 
govern science parks and business incubators in China have thus evolved to meet real 
but changing demands. For instance, the parks had quickly integrated into China’s 
trade strategy, which is undoubtedly a success in the international competition for 
attracting high quality inward investment. The ICs, though hardly interact with local 
entities so far, stand for an explicit commitment to the role of the domestic small 
private enterprises in the development of high-tech industries and China’s indigenous 
technology competitiveness while persistent efforts are being made to rectify their 
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weaknesses. Soon, given the country’s steadily updated comparative advantage, a 
newly evolved governance model for science parks and business incubators might be 
anticipated, based on its recently surfaced strategy to build ‘an innovative state’ 
(Zheng and Chen, 2006). 
 
Notes 
1
. The oldest science park in the USA is the Stanford Research Park, established in 
1951. The first business incubator, created in 1956, was situated in Batavia. 
2
. It was named after the date of its establishment, March 1986. 
3
. With the global proliferation of such parks, various names and models emerged. 
Science parks are often referred to as ‘research parks’, ‘technology parks’, 
‘technoparks’ and ‘technopoles’. In the Chinese case, new variants include ‘science 
and technology industry parks’ and ‘high- and new-technology industry development 
zones’ (Ma and Goo, 2005). 
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Table 1 Development of China’s Science Parks 
 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook on High Technology Industry (1995-2007), National 
Bureau of Statistics 
 
Year Output value 
(billion 
dollars) 
Ratio in total  
High-tech output 
(%) 
Export value 
(billion 
dollars) 
Ratio in total 
High-tech export 
(%) 
1995 16.9 34.5% 2.9 21.6% 
1996 25.8 43.8% 4.3 N/A 
1997 37.5 52.1% 6.5 N/A 
1998 52.2 60.9% 8.5 34.5% 
1999 68.4 69.0% 10.6 36.4% 
2000 100.0 79.5% 19.0 46.4% 
2002 186.9 97.6% 32.9 45.2% 
2003 252.7 98.2% 51.0 46.4% 
2004 331.9 98.9% 82.3 45.9% 
2005 352.1 84.3% 111.6 52.0% 
2006 448.3 85.5% 136.1 46.4% 
